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Introduction 
Of interest to this paper are two major aims Camus and Levinas have in common: the first is 
to examine the ways in which Western philosophy has ingrained totalitarianism in its thought, 
and the second is to establish a possibility of interacting with the other that remains just. They 
both seek to establish whether a society which does not oppress the Other is possible and, as 
such, the establishing of a base possibility of action towards the Other is necessary. And yet 
despite these overarching similarities, they end up writing of these things in very different, 
sometimes irreconcilable ways. The primary concern of this paper is the establishing of this 
foundation upon which interaction with the Other is possible; I aim to examine the 
differences between Camus and Levinas on this topic and what they ultimately mean for their 
philosophies from the focal question of ‘how can we interact with the Other?’. My claim is 
that the symmetry in Camus’ understanding of the relationship with the Other results in an 
interaction which allows for the creation of meaning between the subject and Other that 
Levinas fails to leave room for. 
Camus and Levinas are both ethical thinkers writing in the wake of WWII, at the 
point where a resurgence of ethics becomes urgently needed. They take a remarkably similar 
attitude towards WWII; they both believe that what transpired was a result of systematic and 
deeply engrained totalitarian line of thought in Western philosophy, where murder has been 
defended by ideologies and philosophy. Camus claims that crime has been made reasonable, 
that it is no longer done by individuals, but rather by states – it has become the law. He states: 
“As soon as man […] takes refuge in a doctrine, as soon as he makes his crime reasonable, it 
multiplies like Reason herself and assumes all the figures of a syllogism” (Camus, 1954, 11). 
Similarly, Levinas states: “The art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means – 
politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason” (Levinas, 1969, 21). They 
both focus on the notion that crime has been made reasonable, that it is being justified, and 
from then on they put Western philosophy under scrutiny, each of them following different 
threads in an attempt to unravel what it is in (their) contemporary thought that has allowed for 
these developments. Levinas’ and Camus’ primary concerns remain with rendering justice to 
the Other, and they attempt to establish way of thinking that will allow for the existence and 
interaction with Others instead of their subjugation. They write with the same sort of drive, 
believing that the question of the relationship to the Other needs to take center stage, a 
conviction for which they derive the urgency out of having witnessed the mass scale 
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dehumanization and murder that has occurred in light of this question being disregarded or 
thought in the wrong way.  
Although not an immensely popular subject, there have been some comparisons made 
between Levinas and Camus, particularly on the subject of political philosophy. Saller, for 
instance, compares the two in the context of intellectual resistance to totalitarianism (Sessler, 
2008), while Sharpe brings the two thinkers together with the claim that they both tie 
“subjectivity to a primordial responsibility before and for other subjects” (Sharpie, 2011, 
82), in an attempt to shed more light Camus’ ethical philosophy which has remained much 
less addressed than Levinas’.  
I too am interested in bringing these two thinkers together, although my approach 
pushes them more against each other. Despite their similar topics, Camus and Levinas end up 
reasoning in very different ways, and this leads to some major differences in the their 
ultimate frameworks of the relationship towards the Other. I am interested in establishing a 
dialogue between the two and pinpointing where they diverge, ultimately leaning towards 
Camus’ approach. As the primary concern of both of these thinkers in regards to ethics is to 
not allow philosophy to exclude elements important to the justice of the Other, their 
philosophies lend themselves well to the notion of an ongoing discussion which allows for 
the reexamination and reforming of these values. In fact, both of them explicitly state 
something of the like – Camus states that rebellion must continue as long as there is 
suffering, and since there will always be suffering, consequently rebellion can never end 
(Camus, 1954). Levinas states that face of the Other, as the opening of difference, is the 
opening of ethics, and we must continually engage with the dialogue that the Other opens for 
us – we must be open to respond (Leivnas, 1969). While these stances are not identical in 
their reasoning, their message is clear: the conversation must be kept open. In that sense, the 
question of how to relate to the Other remains just as relevant today as when Levinas and 
Camus wrote their works; the context may no longer be WWII, but establishing a foundation 
upon which interaction with the Other is possible remains crucial. It is not a static thing that 
can be posited, but rather something that must be allowed to reform itself. In that sense this 
paper is an attempt to keep that dialogue open and address several key issues to the 
foundation of ethics.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: I start with a basic comparison of their 
general worldviews: how the subject and Other relate, and what worldview is implied in this 
relation. I then focus on the concept of transcendence, going into what this term means to 
each of them and how they use it.  From there I lean on Derrida to illustrate some problems 
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that arise from this for Levinas, continuing on why Levinas still faces a number of problems 
in his later work, despite attempting to answer Derrida’s critique. In the final chapter I 
discuss Camus on the notion of a symmetrical relationship with the Other as an alternative to 
Levinas. I then conclude my comparison between them. I find that Camus’ notion of the 
symmetrical relationship to the Other allows for a more mobile interaction, which, in turn, 
allows for the creation of meaning between the subject and Other.  
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Chapter 1: Camus and Levinas: basic comparison of philosophies 
As brought up in the introduction, although Camus and Levinas have similar aims, they end 
up writing on the same subject in very different ways. In the current chapter I examine their 
basic positions on the relationship with the Other, and the assumptions about the relationship 
between subject and world that inform these views. Here I delineate some major similarities 
and differences between the two authors, and in the subsequent chapters I detail the 
consequences of these differences. I first address Levinas, then Camus, and end with a 
comparison between the two.  
 
1.1:  Levinas 
In Totality and Infinity Levinas describes the relationship between the subject and world as 
one of enjoyment. The world of objects is where the subject feels at home, where it can fully 
exercise its own freedom. Freedom is defined by this relationship between subject and world 
– freedom is being able to do as one pleases, to be able to understand and to act in accordance 
to one’s own wishes. In this world of objects the subject gets to be active, to create and define 
itself, to turn objects into things ‘for itself’. The subject does not have to accept the world as 
it is given, but rather, it gets to shape it and use it, and through this discover itself and enjoy 
its own existence. This freedom of action constitutes ‘interiority’, and it is within interiority 
that enjoyment exists. Levinas states: “Freedom […] is the production of the I and not one 
experience among Others that “happens” to the I. […] To be I, atheist, at home with oneself, 
separated, happy, created – these are synonyms.” (Levinas, 1969, 148). Freedom lies at the 
very center of interiority and enjoyment and it is an active production of the ‘I’. This 
interiority, as the domain of freedom, becomes the basis from which the self can interact with 
Others. Levinas considers it indispensable to have an interior life in order to form 
interpersonal relations. However, the way the subject functions by itself and the way it 
functions with Others is fundamentally different. What is regular in the relation to objects 
becomes totalitarian in the relation to other subjects. The relationship to the other is primarily 
defined by an interruption; the Other causes the subject to become aware that it is not as 
absolutely free as it felt. He states: “The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the 
consciousness of my own injustice – the shame that freedom feels for itself.” (Levinas, 1969, 
86).  
Levinas describes the encounter as the confrontation of the face-to-face. The self is 
interrupted in its free interaction with objects and confronted with the reality of the Other, 
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with the realization that it is not alone. The Other, says Levinas, is precisely the one who puts 
freedom into question, who resists this movement of comprehension and consumption. The 
Other resists the power of the subject and as such reveals the initial idea of absolute freedom 
as not only naïve, but also violent. Levinas states: “Discourse and Desire, where the Other 
presents himself as interlocutor, as him over whom I cannot have power, whom I cannot kill, 
condition this shame, where, qua I, I am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer” 
(Levinas, 1969, 84). Confronted with the Other, the subject finds itself suddenly guilty of 
attempting to override the Other’s existence. 
The Other is not initially thought of as a fact, but rather desired. The Other interrupts 
the interaction between subject and objects, and as such is impossible to ignore. It is only 
after this initial confrontation that the subject tries to categorize the Other, to conceptualize it 
into something comprehensible. But in the first encounter with the Other, in the shame one 
feels at the first interruption of one’s previously unlimited freedom, morality is born. As 
summarized by Peperzak, “The encounter with another reveals the supreme law: my selfhood 
must bow before the absoluteness revealed by another's look or speech” (Peperzak, 1991, 
444). The Other demands a response, and from then on the question of justice becomes 
relevant, as it becomes possible for one to be just or unjust to the Other. In short, the Other 
refuses to become part of the world of objects and by this reveals that the subject never lived 
in isolation at all, that it simply failed to see the Other who was always already there. In the 
face of this the self feels shame and guilt, but also desire for this alterity. For Levinas, the 
Other is always higher than the self, as it offers a glimpse of the infinite, and it is in this that 
the Other is desired. Levinas states: “It is necessary to have the idea of infinity, […] in order 
to know one’s own imperfection. The idea of the perfect is not an idea but desire; it is the 
welcoming of the Other, the commencement of moral consciousness, which calls into question 
my freedom.” (Levinas, 1969, 84). Levinas states that the Other can never be fully grasped, 
that there will always remain something that is fundamentally incomprehensible, namely an 
interiority that can never be reached. As such, the Other may always reveal something new to 
the self. To attempt to categorize and understand the Other fully is therefore an attempt to 
limit this infinity, and hence an act of violence, an attempt at totalization.  
Levinas extends on the concept of desire; he makes a distinction by speaking of 
regular desire and ‘metaphysical Desire’, or simply a capitalized ‘Desire’. Metaphysical 
Desire does not desire a return to something familiar, but it desires something new and 
different. Levinas states that this Desire is not like other desires that can be satisfied – one 
cannot nourish it as one would do with food. “The metaphysical desire has another intention; 
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it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness – the Desired 
does not fulfill it, but deepens it” (Levinas, 1969, 34). Metaphysical Desire is fundamentally 
different from the way in which objects are desired; the desire for objects is more akin to a 
need, one which can be satisfied with the attainment of the desired object. Metaphysical 
Desire, however, is fundamentally impossible; it is precisely a desire for that which cannot be 
had. However, that is not to say that it is inherently negative. Levinas explains: “it is a 
relationship whose positivity comes from remoteness, from separation, for it nourishes itself, 
one might say, with its hunger” (Levinas, 1969, p. 34). The Desire for the Other may never 
be satisfied, but the Desire is enriching in itself – it opens up the subject to the world of 
alterity precisely by its very impossibility. Levinas states: “A desire without satisfaction 
which, precisely, understands [entend] the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the 
Other […]. The very dimension of height is opened up by metaphysical Desire.” (Levinas, 
1969, 34-5). The Desire for otherness must be unsatisfactory by its very nature, but it is this 
which allows for the self to come into contact with something new, something outside itself.  
In his later work Otherwise Than Being (1974), Levinas refines his position on the 
relationship between the subject, the world, and the Other. Answering Derrida’s critique, 
Levinas no longer holds as strict of a division in which the Other is in difference and the 
subject in the realm of the same, instead allowing for difference to already permeate the 
subject, thereby opening the subject instead of presenting it as a cohesive whole. Aside from 
this refining, much of the initial structure remains intact – the Other is still that which allows 
for the subject to step outside of itself; the Other is still desired and still opens up the 
dimension of height. I treat this subject in more detail in the third chapter. 
 
1.2: Camus 
Camus’ focus is rebellion, and it is from the moment of protest that he extrapolates a number 
of the points he makes. His concept of rebellion will be detailed in the subsequent chapter, 
while here the focus is primarily the relationship to the world and to Others that Camus 
establishes and that this rebellion is in relation to. For Camus the subject’s relation to the 
world is always lacking and insufficient. The rebellion that Camus speaks of is twofold: it is a 
rebellion against the human condition as much as it is against human-made suffering. Both 
cases of rebellion function similarly: “in both cases we find an assessment of values in the 
name of which the rebel refuses to accept the condition in which he finds himself” (Camus, 
1954, 29). The rebel is therefore in tension both in regards to Others, as well as to the world 
at large.  
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There is an inherent ambivalence that the subject experiences towards the world; the 
subject desires the world and wants to understand it and to feel at home in it. The world, 
however, is indifferent to human desire and does not respond to these needs; there is an 
inherent strangeness to it which refuses to be understood: “at the heart of all beauty lies 
something inhuman” (Camus, 1954, 20). Life can never be fully grasped, nor can it be made 
to last. The final death sentence awaits regardless of the amount of repulsion it may produce. 
This absurdist outlook is outlined in The Myth of Sisyphus, and it is the starting point in The 
Rebel, where Camus moves on to more ethical considerations. So the rebel is faced with a 
desire towards the world at the same time as being faced with the impossibility of the 
fulfilment of this desire. The relationship to the world is therefore in perpetual tension; the 
subject belongs to the world and cannot even fathom its own existence outside of it; it desires 
the world while knowing that this is an impossible desire.  Although the world is desired, it is 
not unconditionally accepted – there are things within the world, such as human suffering and 
death, which the rebel cannot grow to accept despite the knowledge that they cannot be 
evaded. So the rebel stays in tension, affirming and denying aspects of reality; this tension is 
inherent to rebellion and cannot be resolved. What the rebel rejects of the world is its 
suffering, its meaninglessness, and its death sentence, but this rejection is incomplete, and it 
is never a rejection of the world as a whole. The rejection is incomplete because it is 
simultaneously done for the world; for Camus this point is vital, he says of rebellion  – “But 
it rejects the world on account of what it lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is” 
(Camus, 1954, 226). What is accepted of the world is life itself, and the potential for human-
created meaning and unity it holds. The rebel can never accept death, but nor can death be 
escaped; rather, what the rebel manages to reject is the implication of death, the lack of 
meaning that it implies for human life. In other words, the rebel searches for reasons for 
living. The rebel rejects aspects of the world in favour of Others; Camus states: “The 
contradiction is this: man rejects the world as it is, without accepting the necessity of 
escaping it” (Camus, 1954, 226). This partial acceptance and rejection is born out of the 
impossible desire for the world.  “Far from always wanting to forget it, they suffer, on the 
contrary, from not being able to possess it completely enough […]” (Camus, 1954, 226).  
The same applies to the relationship between people: the rebel wishes to establish 
limits and these limits imply only a partial acceptance of the Other. The rebel “says yes and 
no at the same time” (Camus, 1954, p. 19). It starts with the setting of a limit – the rebel 
refuses to accept being treated a certain way any longer. This same impulse can arise for the 
sake of someone else; Camus notes that revolt “can also break out at the mere spectacle of 
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oppression of which someone else is the victim” (Camus, 1954, 22). In either case what 
occurs in rebellion is that the rebel “affirms that there are limits and also that he suspects – 
and wishes to preserve – the existence of certain things beyond those limits. He stubbornly 
insists that there are certain things in him which ‘are worth while…’ and which must be 
taken into consideration” (Camus, 1954, 19). So the rebel begins to develop a certain concept 
of humanity through this encounter with the Other and through the realization that there is a 
need for the establishment of a limit. Camus considers this as a moment of identification; the 
rebel “comes to the conclusion that a command has infringed on something inside him that 
does not belong to him alone, but which he has in common with other men – even with the 
man who insults and oppresses him” (Camus, 1954, 22). There is an implicit solidarity with 
humanity inherent to rebellion. The nature of this identification will be explored further in the 
fourth chapter. It is important to note that the limitation of the Other does not mean the 
exclusion of the Other; rebellion finds its justification in the inclusion of all of humanity and 
consequently loses this justification the moment it ceases to do so. So the limitation of the 
Other refers specifically to the limitation of the unlimited freedom of the Other and the power 
the Other has over the subject. It is in this sense that Camus differs from Levinas – he 
incorporates in his thought the notion that the subject should limit the Other for its own sake. 
He also considers the limitation of the Other to be necessary for everyone’s sake, including 
the Other, but this will also be explored further in the fourth chapter.  
 
1.3: Concluding comparison 
Camus and Levinas both name a tension and ambiguity, a feeling of insufficiency and 
limitation, as well as an impotent desire; however, I argue that they both place this very 
differently. For Camus the subject is in tension both with the world and the Other in a similar 
fashion – both are desired and both can never be fully attained. But it is also true that neither 
is accepted absolutely; the rebel rejects aspects of the world and rejects the reality in which 
human lives are disregarded, and this rejection involves for him the limitation of the Other. 
Nothing is an unconditional ‘yes’ for Camus; it is imperative that the rebel stays within 
tension, not giving up one side for an absolute affirmation of the Other. The Other is never 
unconditionally accepted, just as the world in its raw form is never fully accepted, despite the 
fact that the subject is attached to both and cannot do without them. The subject exists in 
tension, and this tension must be maintained.  
For Levinas the separation between the subject and the Other seems fairly complete in 
Totality and Infinity, but is toned back significantly in Otherwise Than Being. The subject 
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begins to carry difference in itself, and as such is never absolutely free. Despite this, there is 
still a significant difference between the relationship between the subject and world and 
subject and Other. The relationship between subject and world is still primarily easy and free; 
the uncertainty centers in the relationship with the Other. The world of objects is defined by 
satisfaction of needs, not by unfulfilled desire. The Other, in contrast, is desired but never 
attained. There is an insurmountable height that separates the self from the Other and it is 
precisely that which makes the Other so desirable. But the subject cannot fully understand the 
Other, and it is totalitarian when it attempts to do so. Instead, the Other must be accepted and 
this acceptance opens up the possibility for something new to enter into the world of the 
subject. This relationship of Desire for the Other is fundamental for the subject; it is forever 
unsatisfactory, but without it the subject is trapped in the world of the same, it is incapable of 
ever encountering anything new or creating it for itself, the Other is imperative for this. The 
very impossibility of the fulfillment of Desire is necessary. 
I argue that this is very different from the way Camus speaks about desire; for him 
both the world and the Other are desirable and not fully attainable, but there is nothing 
inherently valuable in this unattainability in itself. The subject desperately wishes for the 
world to make sense, for Others to be fully understandable and for it to be possible for people 
to fully belong to each other. There is nothing wrong with the desire to understand and to 
have in itself for Camus, either towards the world or towards other people; it is simply a fact 
that it is impossible to fully attain. But nor is there any value in this impossibility; that too is 
simply an unfortunate fact of existence. However, due to the fact that it is impossible to either 
satisfy or dismiss this desire, a certain tension inevitably arises. Camus only ethical statement 
is that one should not seek recluse from this tension. But that does not mean that this desire 
should not be pursued; in fact rebellion is to a large extent the pursuit for unity and 
understanding. Still, rebellion must recognize its limits – it would not be justified if it started 
to believe it can, or has the right to, fully categorize Others. So for Camus there is no 
fundamental distinction in the way the desire for Others and the desire for the world 
functions. He uses terms such as ‘understanding’, ‘belonging’, ‘unity’, ‘having’ 
interchangeably for both. They do not cause a problem for him as they do for Levinas. For 
Levinas the Other may be desired, but one should not attempt to know this Other as one 
would objects, where one has complete freedom of action.  
The difference, once again, can be found in the placement of tension. Camus finds it 
imperative to stay in tension both towards the world and towards Others, while Levinas 
resolves this by separating the two – he places all the tension in the relationship to the Other 
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and eliminates it entirely from the relationship to the world. With this for Levinas the Other 
gains an impossible height while the world gains simplicity. When it comes down to practical 
action as informed by philosophy, their views are remarkably similar: they both believe the 
Other requires a response and this must be taken seriously: it can never be philosophically 
justified to deny the humanity of an Other. But their ideas of how to relate to the Other are 
different. The question of the height of the Other becomes important. For Levinas the Other 
is higher than the self, so the social relationship is constituted by a transcendence, a 
movement from the self into something beyond itself. Camus does not aim to explain the 
question of how we relate to the Other, but he also uses the term transcendence, albeit in a 
different way than Levinas. The Other is different in the two of them, so the interaction with 
the subject is consequently different as well. The question of how to interact with the Other 
has to do with the height of the Other, and this relates to transcendence. The following 
chapter examines the use of transcendence in their philosophies.  
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Chapter 2: On Transcendence 
Camus and Levinas write their ethical philosophies in the wake of WWII, aiming to examine 
what it is in western philosophy that has left room for something like that to have occurred. 
One major thing they both address is Hegelian thought and the deification of history. The 
primary concern they both express is that the line of thinking that allows for nothing to stand 
outside of history leaves no room for values that stand beyond the passage of time and the 
current trends the time embraces. Their issue with this is specifically that in such a system 
there is nothing to defend human lives from being obliterated. They both end up making a 
call for some form of transcendence as a solution to this. In this chapter I first clarify their 
objections to the deification of history in order to contextualize the way in which they use the 
term ‘transcendence’, and then address their respective philosophies regarding transcendence 
more specifically. Their views on Hegelian history are quite similar; they are not identical – 
they focus on different aspects and defend them using different means – but the underlying 
issue they find with Hegelian thought is the same. I show some of their similarities and 
differences regarding Hegelian thought. I start by detailing Levinas’ objections to Hegelian 
history, followed by Camus, and then do a comparison of the two. I follow this by a section 
focusing more specifically on transcendence, speaking first of Levinas and then of Camus. 
 
2.1: Why transcendence: the objection to the deification of history 
2.1.1: Levinas on the deification of history 
Levinas focuses primarily on the totalizing effect of reducing the Other to history. History, 
for Levinas, reduces the ‘saying’ to the ‘said’ (Levinas, 2009, 37) . For him it is the encounter 
with the Other that is of importance – Levinas’ focus is on the act of speaking that happens 
during the encounter with the Other, not on the story it’s made in after. Something is 
inherently lost when the dynamic encounter with the Other is reduced to a static story. 
Levinas states: “History as a relationship between men ignores a position of the I before the 
Other in which the Other remains transcendent with respect to me...When man truly 
approaches the Other he is uprooted from history” (Levinas, 1969, 52). The events that 
history traces are only a simplified story created out of the reality of the encounter, and as 
such history can never do justice to everything that a human being is. Levinas states that a 
world in which virtue cannot be defended and only history has value is inevitably totalitarian. 
He emphasizes that in such a system humans become mere tools to be used by the system, 
rather than being accepted with their full humanity. Levinas states that in order to be 
understood, the Other is treated as an object, and through this is brought down to the level of 
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‘the same’. As noted by Sessler, Levinas considers that the totalizing tendency of western 
philosophy in its approach to the Other has reached its peak in (his) modern times, as is 
visible in Hegelian philosophy of history, in which the Other becomes an instrument to be 
manipulated by reason (Sessler, 2005, 126-7). 
Levinas criticizes the Hegelian dialectic for producing a system of recognition in 
which only masters and slaves exist; like Hegel he asserts that the ego becomes conscious of 
itself in relation and interaction with Others, but criticizes Hegel for making a framework in 
which this encounter between subjects is inevitably a confrontation which is only resolved 
when one decides to submit to the mastery of the Other. And even then it is never fully 
resolved, because recognition from another only matters if the Other is already accepted as 
equal. In Levinas’ theory consciousness is also tied to the Other; the ego becomes self-
conscious when the Other confronts it in its shame and causes it to question whether its 
existence is justified (Sessler, 2005, 127-8). But this interaction is not violent; it is peaceful 
and opens up the possibility for the subject to exit the realm of the same. The two must learn 
how to live together and there is the danger of the ego transgressing the Other, but in itself 
the encounter does not necessitate the subjugation of one to the other, both may coexist 
without destroying each other. Levinas insists on the irreducibility of human lives to Hegelian 
thought and historicity. “Against the universalism of Hegelian reality.. .we [are] insisting on 
the irreducibility of the personal to the universality of the State” (Sessler, 2005, 129). “The 
politics of the face” is a safeguard against the objectification of the Other; Levinas insists that 
the Other must be addressed in all their difference, and their immediacy must be 
acknowledged, rather than turned into a concept (Sessler, 2005, 132). 
 
2.1.2: Camus on the deification of history 
One of Camus’ objections in regards to acting towards the future has to do with the 
justification of concrete action in the present for the sake of an ideology that is to create a 
better world at some undefined point in the future. Camus’ critique comes at the fact that this 
line of thought places its salvation at the end of history, and in doing so justifies any action so 
long as it contributes to the cause. In this Camus reads the danger of principles giving way to 
history – if there is only the guiding principle of a future that’s to come, there is nothing to 
determine whether actions are good or bad aside from whether they end up contributing to the 
cause. He sees this happening in Stalinist Marxism, as well as Hegelian thought, and states: 
“When good and evil are reintegrated in time and confused with events, nothing is any longer 
good or bad, but only either premature or out of date. Who will decide on the opportunity, if 
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not the opportunist?” (Camus, 1954, 177). In this framework the end justifies the means, and 
no action is condemnable simply for what it is.  
Camus further criticizes Hegelian thought for taking principles and submitting them 
to history. In so doing, he states, they remove the stability of these principles, which are from 
then on to be swept by events that occur in history. “Into the fixed ideas of its period, 
German thought suddenly introduced an irresistible urge to movement. Truth, reason, and 
justice were brusquely incarnated in the future of the world” (Camus, 1954, 104). Ideals 
begin to be in constant flux, and “by committing them to perpetual acceleration, German 
ideology confused their existence with their movements and fixed the conclusions of their 
existence at the conclusion of the historic future – if there was to be one.” (Camus, 1954, 
104). If there is nothing to validate these principles but history itself, then they have no 
meaning until the end of history is reached, and the final judgment is made. Values cease to 
be static, they move alongside the events in history, and as such hold no stability. And if they 
are as unstable as history itself, they certainly cannot function as guides. Camus states: 
“These values have ceased to be guides in order to become goals. As for the means of 
attaining these goals, in other words life and history, no pre-existing value can point the 
way.” (Camus, 1954, 104). If these values are indefinitely suspended, then everything before 
the end of time is permitted – it is impossible to know what will contribute to the end of 
history, so everything is justified in the meantime. But we are not at the end of history, and so 
the entirety of human life is left without guiding principles. “The rule of action has thus 
become action itself – which must be performed in darkness while awaiting the final 
illumination.” (Camus, 1954, 104). 
Hegel’s followers, Camus states, have destroyed formal principles of virtue, retaining 
only “the vision of a history without any kind of transcendence dedicated to perpetual strife 
and to the struggle of wills bent on seizing power.” (Camus, 1954, p. 105). Force becomes 
the manner of action; it shows itself to be efficient, and without any distinctions between 
right and wrong, efficacy is the only thing that can be established. And if only the end of 
history can make a value judgment on the use of force, then force becomes a legitimate tool 
that works towards establishing this end of history that will justify it. “Impurity, the 
equivalent of history, is going to become the rule, and the abandoned earth will be delivered 
to naked force which will decide whether or not man is divine.” (Camus, 1954, p. 105). 
History becomes deified: “Thus lies and violence are adopted in the same spirit in which a 
religion is adopted and on the same heartening impulse” (Camus, 1954, p. 105), as it 
becomes the only means of justifying human actions and lives.  
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But in this system established with the Hegelian dialectic, Camus continues, the only 
principle is power, and so only masters and slaves exist. Camus states that contemporary 
ideologies, following Hegel, “conceive of history as the product of and mastery of slavery” 
(Camus, 1954, p. 106) and because of this cannot envision or work towards making it 
something different. Camus claims that it is impossible to exit this line of thinking without 
abandoning the Hegelian dialectic. “If, on the first morning of the world, under the empty sky, 
there is only a master and a slave; even if there is only the bond of master and slave between 
a transcendent god and mankind, then there can be no other law in this world but the law of 
force.” (Camus, 1954, p. 106). There needs to be something that stands outside of this system 
to allow for human interaction to not be reduced to a power struggle in which the only 
options are to kill and enslave or to be killed or enslaved. The call Camus makes is here 
explicitly one of transcendence. “Only a god, or a principle above the master and the slave, 
could intervene and make men’s history more than a simple chronicle of victories and 
defeats.”(Camus, 1954, p. 106). The transcendence Camus speaks of is first and foremost a 
transcendence above the Hegelian dialectic – even a transcendent god is insufficient if the 
fundamentals of the master-slave relationship are unchanged.  
 
2.1.3: Comparison 
Levinas’ and Camus’ objections lie very closely together on a number of points; they both 
critique the assertion that nothing lies outside of history,  see the deification of history as 
inherently dangerous, and want to establish something that stands above it – something that 
transcends history. The attitudes they have towards the deification of history are very clear in 
their respective critiques of Hegelian philosophy. Hegelian thought deifies history – both 
Levinas and Camus make this statement, and find this deification to be dangerous. They both 
assert that a world in which virtue cannot be defended and only history has value is inevitably 
totalitarian. They emphasize that in such a system humans become mere tools to be used by 
the system, rather than being accepted with their full humanity. Camus and Levinas find issue 
both in Hegel himself, and in the orthodox way his followers have taken up Hegelian 
philosophy. While they agree that Hegel’s followers have simplified and misused his 
philosophy, turning it to much more sinister uses than Hegel intended, they believe that 
Hegel’s philosophy already contains totalitarian grains of thought in itself, and thereby 
unwittingly sets the ground for the uses Hegel’s followers enact. 
The call for transcendence is another point in which Camus and Levinas converge; the 
similarities between them are apparent – both call for a transcendence above history. 
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However, upon closer examination, their views begin to differ. Levinas specifically refers to 
a transcendent god, or rather, a social relation that gains a religious dimension, while Camus 
(while leaving the option of a transcendent god open) pointedly decides to not speak about it, 
but focus specifically on a transcendence of human lives which is defensible without an 
appeal to a god. Camus is interested in establishing a justification for human action based 
exclusively on what can be experienced and spoken of. So when he speaks of transcendence, 
he is referring specifically to something that stands above history, but not something that 
gains the height of a god. Both Camus and Levinas strongly state that transcendence cannot 
be absolute – it must be connected to history while not being equated to it, and to go too far 
with transcendence is as detrimental as to deny it completely. However, later in this paper I 
argue that Levinas does not succeed in upholding this delicate balance, despite that being his 
aim. Currently I simply state their views on transcendence starting with Levinas and 
following with Camus, and make this argument in the subsequent section. 
 
2.2: Transcendence 
2.2.1: Levinas on Transcendence 
The notion of transcendence is crucial to Levinas’ framework of interaction with the Other; it 
is through transcendence that the self opens up to alterity and is able to experience the Other. 
Transcendence constitutes the social relation; it is the act of the self moving beyond itself and 
towards the other. For Levinas the Other can never be fully known, and it is totalitarian to 
attempt to reduce the other to the same. Therefore it becomes important to conceive of a way 
in which the self can have a relationship with the absolutely Other “without immediately 
divesting it of its alterity” (Levinas, 1969, 38). This is the role that transcendence fills for 
Levinas. Two things are of importance to Levinas regarding transcendence: that the Other is 
absolutely Other, and that the transcendence is not absolute, that it remains tied to the 
concrete alterity of individual Others. In the subsequent chapter I lean on Derrida to argue 
that Levinas does not succeed in upholding both elements, but in this section I merely outline 
Levinas’ aims.  
It is crucial for Levinas that the Other is absolutely Other: “He and I do not form a 
number. The collectivity in which I say “you” or “we” is not a plural of the “I.”” (Levinas, 
1969, 39). He brings up the idea of radical difference – “other absolutely and not with 
respect to some relative term.” (Levinas, 1969, 347). Such alterity remains inherently hidden, 
by virtue of its nature the self cannot know it: “it is unrevealed because it is One, and 
because making oneself known implies a duality which already clashes with the unity of the 
19 
 
One.” (Levinas, 1969, 347). He wants to work with precisely this type of unsurmountable 
alterity which remains hidden from the self. Levinas wonders in which way such complete 
difference can concern the self and impact it, without thereby revealing itself and ceasing to 
be different. The question he poses is how exactly transcendence can be experienced without 
being reduced to the same.  To answer this, Levinas brings up the one-directionality of the 
movement: it starts from the self and moves outwards without return. “The heteronomous 
experience we seek would be an attitude that cannot be converted into a category, and whose 
movement unto the Other is not recuperated in identification, does not return to its point of 
departure.” (Levinas, 1969, 348). The self makes a movement towards the Other, but this 
movement never makes a full circle back into the self again; the alterity of the Other cannot 
be subsumed in the self to become known and familiar, it remains other.  This is, Levinas 
states, what enables goodness and ‘works’. A ‘work’ constitutes transcendence; he states: “A 
work conceived radically is a movement of the same onto the other which never returns to the 
same.” (Levinas, 1969, 348). Essentially, ‘work’ is the term Levinas uses to describe this 
one-way movement towards alterity.  
Transcendence, here meaning movement towards absolute difference which does not 
return to gain understanding and become identification, is vital to the existence of goodness. 
Goodness without transcendence cannot exist: “goodness is but a dream without 
transcendence, a pure wish […]” (Levinas, 1969, 348). Levinas defines a work, the one-way 
movement from the same towards the alterity of the Other, as a generosity, and he stresses its 
one-sidedness by emphasizing that this generosity is met with ingratitude. The reason for this 
is that for a work to function, for it to really be transcendent, it cannot return to the self, and 
that is precisely what the reciprocal nature of gratitude would achieve. This cements Levinas 
into a one-sidedness, a symmetrical relationship between the self and the Other is 
fundamentally impossible.  Despite this, Levinas does not define this movement towards 
alterity as a pure loss – it moves towards something rather than towards nothing, and is 
therefore not empty. It simply does not expect equal reciprocity. “A work is neither a pure 
acquiring of merits nor a pure nihilism.” (Levinas, 1969, 349). If it were either of these 
things it would be directed towards itself and fail to be transcendent. “A work is thus a 
relationship with the Other who is reached without showing himself touched.” (Levinas, 
1969, 349). If reciprocity is denied, then this generosity the self offers is offered, in effect, for 
the future. “This one-way action is possible only in patience, which, pushed to the limit, 
means for the agent to renounce being the contemporary of its outcome, to act without 
entering the promised land.” (Levinas 1969, 349). Levinas stresses this; to act generously is 
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to act without oneself in mind in radical sense. “The future for which the work is undertaken 
must be posited from the start as indifferent to my death. […] To renounce being the 
contemporary of the triumph of one’s work is to have this triumph in a time without me, to 
aim at this world without me, to aim at a time beyond the horizon of my time” (Levinas, 
1969, 349). A work is aimed at the Other with no hope of knowing how it reaches, and no 
expectation of reciprocity. The self is insignificant in relation to this work, it does not take 
itself into account. In generosity, the self is as indifferent to its own death as it is towards its 
own existence.  
It is equally important for Levinas that transcendence is not absolute. Levinas does 
not want to speak of a transcendence which is absolutely separate from this world, he does 
not want to argue for “the factitious transcendence of worlds behind the scenes, of the 
Heavenly City gravitating in the skies over the terrestrial city” (Levinas, 2009, 4). He seems 
to regards such a transcendence as absurd, or at the very least as an entirely different thing 
than what he is speaking of. For Levinas transcendence is always in relation to the concrete 
Other, and as such it serves the purpose of being a link between the self and difference in the 
concrete world the self inhabits. “The Being of beings and of worlds, however different 
among themselves they may be, weaves among incomparables a common fate; it puts them in 
conjunction, even if the unity of Being that assembles them is but an analogical unity.” 
(Levinas, 2009, 4). Transcendence is the link between alterities; it is the sole connection 
between the self and the Other and it is the only thing that can join them into some form of 
unity without totalizing them and reducing them to the same. As such, the very purpose of 
transcendence is to allow for an interaction with concrete Others, if it moves beyond this 
world to the extent that it separate from it, if it speaks of the Other as a general term rather 
than as a concrete individual, it loses itself. It is precisely this generalization and totalization 
that Levinas argues against, so it is imperative that transcendence retains its link to the 
concreteness of alterity. 
 
2.2.2: Camus on Transcendence  
To understand Camus’ position on transcendence it is necessary to first state that his primary 
interest is understanding the present through rebellion, and does this by studying the only 
thing he can, which is examples of rebellion he has, and the values and principles they show. 
Camus believes that rebellion is the starting point for both the attitudes that honour lives, and 
those who destroy them. It is his goal to find a measure from within this system. He asserts 
that philosophy is used in his contemporary society to defend murder, and his goal is to find 
21 
 
out whether it has to be used that way, and even whether it is reasonable that it is. He is 
primarily concerned with the rational defense of murder, and it is this that he wants to 
disprove (Camus, 1954). 
Camus’ starting point is the absurd –finding oneself in a world that makes no sense.  
As Foley points out, there is a continuity of thought from The Myth of Sisyphus to The Rebel, 
and Camus is “determined to show that accepting the exigencies dictated by the absurd does 
not lead to nihilism” (Foley, 2014, 56). Camus is aware that the absurd worldview offers no 
guide when it comes to the question of murder. “If one believes in nothing, if nothing makes 
sense, if we can assert no value whatsoever, everything is permissible and nothing is 
important. There is no pro or con; the murder is neither right nor wrong.” (Camus, 1954, 
13). Moving beyond the indifference of the absurd is therefore necessary. However, Camus 
does not want to abandon the absurd, but rather to examine it more thoroughly and see what 
conclusions it leads to, and what can be constructed on top of it. The absurd is a reaction that 
arises when an individual is confronted with the world and experiences its strangeness. The 
absurdist position knows only that it is in the world; it depicts life as meaningless, but Camus 
finds that from the same starting point it is equally possible to derive arguments in support of 
life as against it. A positive argument originating from absurdism begins with a rejection of 
suicide: “Suicide would mean the end of this encounter, and the absurdist position realizes 
that it could not endorse suicide without abolishing its own foundations.” (Camus, 1954, 14). 
Camus is simply stating here that from an absurdist position suicide is not rationally 
justifiable; of course it is still possible, but the absurdist position does not lead to it logically. 
Anything that an absurdist position may want to state stems from its position in the world, 
and if it abandons this it abandons itself. All that Camus initially admits to is the undeniable 
reality of this encounter with the world. Anything further that he wishes to construct must 
refer back to this experience; it has no possible justifications outside of it. Already from here, 
Camus sees an implicit assertion: “But it is plain that absurdist reasoning thereby recognizes 
human life as the single necessary good, because it makes possible that confrontation, and 
because without life the absurdist wager could not go on. To say that life is absurd, one must 
be alive.” (Camus, 1954, 14). The first step is the affirmation of the experience and the 
necessity of the self to be alive to experience it. From here, the affirmation of the value of the 
lives of Others necessarily follows. “The moment life is recognized as a necessary good, it 
becomes so for all men. One cannot find logical consistency in murder, if one denies it in 
suicide.” (Camus, 1954, 14). The question for Camus is specifically about the rationalization 
of murder, rather than the fact of its occurrence, and it is this that he denies from the absurdist 
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position. He places murder and suicide on the same side. If one wishes to deny value in life, 
then this denial must extend to everyone. Suicide is not sufficient to end the existence of life 
and the potential for creating meaning that it carries, and neither is murder. “Equally, if one 
denies that there are grounds for suicide, one cannot claim them for murder. One cannot be a 
part-time nihilist.” (Camus, 1954, 15). It is impossible to defend absurdism while 
simultaneously being willing to sacrifice the lives of Others.  
It is here that Camus finds the limitations of absurdism. The line of thinking that 
forbids murder and that which deems it a matter of indifference both stem from the absurd: 
“In practice, this line of reasoning tells us at one and the same time that killing is permissible 
and that it is not permissible. It abandons us in contradiction, with no grounds for forbidding 
murder or for justifying it […]” (Camus, 1954, 15). All that it achieves is to leave a blank 
slate.  
But answering the question of suicide and murder is imperative to Camus; as Carrol states, 
“For Albert Camus, the question of justice ultimately rests on the basic question of whether 
[…] taking the life of another human being can ever be justified” (Carrol, 2007, 85). So 
Camus asserts that while the absurd does not offer a response in itself, by turning in on itself 
it can reveal more: “I proclaim that I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd, but I 
cannot doubt the validity of my own proclamation and I am compelled to believe, at least, in 
my own protest.” (Camus, 1954, 16). Protest, therefore, becomes central: “The first, and 
only, datum that is furnished me, within absurdist experience, is rebellion” (Camus, 1954, 
16). Rebellion is a response to the condition of the absurd. It arises from encountering the 
chaos and injustice of the human condition; it is a call for order in the face of this absurdity. 
“[…] it insists that the outrage come to an end” (Camus, 1954, 16). Rebellion wants to 
transform the world, but action is necessary for transformation, and the absurd has so far not 
offered any guide for which action is justifiable and which is not. “Hence it is absolutely 
necessary that rebellion derive its justifications from itself, since it has nothing else to derive 
them from. It must consent to study itself, in order to learn how to act.” (Camus, 1954, 16). 
Camus describes his work as an attempt at such a study of rebellion. He does not think that it 
is definitive, but only that it is a possible analysis. In Camus conception, given rebellion as 
his starting point, no appeal for absolute transcendence can be made, only rebellion can 
justify itself. The question here, then, is what exactly Camus is referring to when he talks 
about a value that stands above history, but that does not absolutely transcend it. 
Camus speaks of this partial transcendence in terms of moderation and limits. He 
states that moderation is necessary for rebellion. This moderation applies both to action taken 
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towards Others as well as to the very understanding of the nature of humanity. Rebellion 
wants to establish values, but in the establishing of these values the tie to history and reality 
cannot be broken. “Virtue cannot separate itself from reality without becoming a principle of 
evil. Nor can it identify itself completely with reality without denying itself. The moral value 
brought to light by rebellion, finally, is no farther above life and history than history and life 
are above it.” (Camus, 1954, 260). Virtues that do not take account of concrete human lives 
as they exist in the present are only formal virtues – they are empty, only the content of 
concrete human lives can provide them with meaning. History itself is also only fueled by 
human lives. “[Rebellion] assumes no reality in history until man gives his life for it or 
dedicates himself entirely to it.” (Camus, 1954, 260). Camus stresses that placing values 
entirely above history, with no connection to it, is inherently flawed. “Jacobin and bourgeois 
civilization presumes that values are above history and its formal virtues then lay the 
foundation of a repugnant form of mystification.” (Camus, 1954, 260). This is equally 
dangerous, Camus states, as the opposite, which is bringing values in time and submitting 
them to the flow of history, as he accuses the revolutions of the 20
th
 century for doing. 
Rebellion, then, must reject both of these options in order to remain true to its original 
impulse. “Moderation, confronted with this irregularity, teaches us that at least one part of 
realism is necessary to every ethic: unadulterated virtue, pure and simple, is homicidal.” 
(Camus, 1954, 260). To declare a principle of value that is not directly tied to concrete human 
lives is to allow lives to be sacrificed in its name.  
In order to be successful, revolution must renounce both nihilism as well as solely 
historic values. “Revolution, in order to be creative, cannot do without either a moral or 
metaphysical rule to balance the insanity of history.” (Camus, 1954, 217). Camus 
understands the disdain for formal morality, but believes the mistake of rebellion has been 
“to extend its scorn to every moral attitude.” (Camus, 1954, 217). In fact, Camus states, 
rebellion already finds a guiding principle in its very origins which is neither fully historic 
nor formal. Rebellion says “that revolution must try to act, not in order to come into 
existence at some future date, but in terms of the obscure existence which is already made 
manifest in the act of insurrection.” (Camus, 1954, 217-18). Camus here turns to art to 
explain this rule he speaks of. He does so, because he considers that any guiding principle of 
rebellion must be creative –“[…] we have to live and let live in order to create what we are” 
(Camus, 1954, 218). Rebellion, according to Camus, must fight for that in the present, but 
reject that in the present which suppresses freedom. But if he rejects this, he must reject it for 
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something, and for Camus that is human lives. But if humanity has no given and absolute 
meaning, then its value lies in its ability to create meaning for itself. 
The same line of thinking is reflected in Letters to a German Friend. There too, 
Camus insists on the groundedness of his principles in reality. “I […] chose justice in order 
to remain faithful to the world.” (Camus, 1995, 28). His understanding of the world remains 
the same; he finds no ultimate meaning in it, but asserts that this does not mean that there is 
no meaning to be found in the world whatsoever. It is just that whatever meaning can be 
spoken of must be a meaning found between people, rather than embedded in the structure of 
the world. People insist on meaning, and it is only to people that ‘meaning’ is a term that 
makes sense. To insist on having meaning is to understand meaning at all, that is to say, to be 
capable of having it. And to be capable of having meaning amounts to being meaningful, 
because it is only in relation to someone who understands meaning that meaning makes any 
sense at all. Human life must justify itself, and no principle that stands above it can ever 
achieve this. In that sense, human lives justify themselves in perpetual self-creation and 
affirmation of each other (Camus, 1995, 28). This topic is treated in more detail in the fourth 
chapter. 
Camus ties any principles inevitably to history, despite making sure that they are not 
equated to it. He wants to assert an identity for mankind, a ‘We are’ that cannot be 
transgressed, but he does not want to make a call to an absolute transcendence for this 
justification. “‘We are’ in terms of history, and history must reckon with this ‘We are’ which 
must, in its turn, keep its place in history” (Camus, 1954, 261). Nor does he want to fill the 
content of humanity – he simply states that ‘meaning’ only makes sense in relation to human 
lives and not outside of them. 
 
2.3: Conclusion 
Camus and Levinas both assert that thinking of the Other only through historical terms is 
totalitarian. Their concerns align: the value of human lives must stand above the passage of 
time, it must transcend history. But it is equally important that this transcendence stays tied to 
concrete human lives; if it is entirely separate from this reality or if it generalizes humans to 
the point where they become nothing more than a concept, it again becomes totalitarian. 
Their aims are the same, but the way in which they approach transcendence and the full 
extent of the role transcendence plays in their philosophies is different. For Levinas, 
transcendence constitutes the social relation; transcendence is the opening of the self towards 
difference, it is what enables the self to have a relationship with the Other without reducing 
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the Other to the same. For Camus this is not the case – he uses transcendence primarily to 
establish that the value of human lives is not transient and cannot be lost to history, but unlike 
Levinas he does not speak of transcendence in terms of the individual relationship between 
the self and the Other. In a lot of ways the transcendence Camus speaks of is simpler than 
Levinas’, and so he does not run into the same problems that Levinas does; Levinas must 
tread the line of establishing the Other as immeasurably high, as offering a glimpse of the 
infinite while still remaining concrete and human, relatable and yet irreconcilably different. 
In the following chapter I examine the difficulties Levinas runs into by leaning on Derrida’s 
critique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Chapter 3: Derrida and Levinas on Otherness  
Levinas’ concept of transcendence and his insistence on framing the Other as the Most High 
causes the question of meaning and its formation to become problematic for him in a way in 
which it does not for Camus. In this section I lean on Derrida to state the problems Levinas 
runs into. Derrida criticizes Levinas’ Totality and Infinity on a number of points, with the 
main criticism being that Levinas elevates the Other to such a degree that the Other ceases to 
be human. Derrida’s concern is that raising the Other to the degree of claiming that it is 
infinitely high and infinitely different inevitably leads to turning the Other into another kind 
of totality. There is a radical difference between the realm of the same and of difference for 
Levinas, one which Derrida thinks is impossible to sustain. Levinas addresses Derrida’s 
critique in Otherwise Than Being, but I argue that the answer he provides is insufficient – he 
does not change his framework enough to allow for the Other to really be a determinate 
Other. In this section I first refer to Derrida to criticize Levinas, then go through Levinas’ 
response to show he does not manage to escape Derrida’s criticism.   
 
3.1: Derrida’s Critique 
3.1.1: The physicality of the Other and its relation to language 
Derrida asserts that for the Other to be a concrete Other, it must be thought of as having a 
concrete body and therefore existing in space. He insists that there is an “essential finitude of 
a face (glance –speech) which is a body and not, as Levinas continually insists, the corporeal 
metaphor of etherealized thought” (Derrida, 1978, 143). It is impossible to speak of the 
Other, states Derrida, if the Other does not first appear as a phenomenon. The Other (in its 
specific alterity) must first appear as an ego (in general). “One could neither speak, nor have 
any sense of the totally other, if there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence 
of the totally other as such” (Derrida, 1978, 154). For Levinas the relationship with the Other 
is not in the realm of the spatial, but rather the field of discourse. This distinction is 
significant for Levinas because the spatial realm is the realm of the same, the realm of 
objects, and the language used there is conceptual, and to include the Other in this realm is to 
totalize it. Derrida takes issue with this and asserts first of all that it is impossible to take the 
Other out of space, and second of all that it is impossible to take speech out of space (Derrida, 
1978, 154). Others have a physical presence, a concrete body, and it is through this body that 
we can speak of them as exterior to the self, and therefore as different. “Bodies, transcendent 
and natural things, are others in general for my consciousness. They are outside, and their 
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transcendence is the sign of an already irreducible alterity.” (Derrida, 1978, 155). But this is 
already a very spatial way of framing the Other, and Derrida criticizes Levinas for not taking 
the reality of the external world seriously. To neutralize space, says Derrida, is to neutralize 
the Other as Other. 
Derrida continues to say that since exteriority and interiority are spatial terms, they 
are a part of conceptuality – language is not opposed to them. “For the meanings which 
radiate from Inside-Outside, from Light-Night, etc., do not only inhabit the proscribed words; 
they are embedded, in person or vicariously, at the very heart of conceptuality itself.” 
(Derrida, 1978, 140-141). There is no such thing as an absolute inside or absolute outside – if 
it were so we could not speak of it at all. Levinas ends up in contradiction; he says the Other 
is outside of space, and yet the exteriority of the Other is already a spatial term.  “This text of 
the glance is also the text of speech. Therefore it can be called Face. But one must not expect, 
henceforth, to separate language and space, to empty language of space” (Derrida, 1978, 
141). Language has a double dimension; it categorizes, it reduces, but within that it allows for 
speaking of the Other at all and communicating. This double dimension is unavoidable; to 
conceptualize is to do violence, but without this violence no discourse would be possible at 
all. Derrida states that Levinas is not authorized to speak of the infinitely Other if the Other 
does not appear in the same, and the fact that Levinas does in fact speak of the Other places 
him in an impossible position: “by refusing to acknowledge an intentional modification of the 
ego – which would be a violent and totalitarian act for him – he deprives himself of the very 
foundation and possibility of his own language.” (Derrida, 1978, 156). The same, says 
Derrida, is “the neutral level of transcendental description” (Derrida, 1978, 156). It is only 
through appearing in this zone that the Other lends itself to language and can be spoken of at 
all.  Language, states Derrida, is exterior and can only speak of the Other as exterior, and yet 
discourse is the only way in which we can communicate with the Other. Violence is already 
inherent in discourse, it is impossible to strip it of discourse and leave it perfectly peaceful as 
Levinas deems it to be. Yet there is nothing outside it, and the possibility of peace exists only 
within it: “Peace, like silence, is the strange vocation of a language called outside itself by 
itself.” (Derrida, 1978, 145). It is precisely discourse which calls itself to peace, not 
something lying outside of it. Derrida further explores the term ‘absolutely Other’ and shows 
the contradictions that inevitably arise when it is followed to its logical conclusions. 
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3.1.2: The Other as alter-ego  
Derrida states that the infinitely Other cannot be other as a positive infinity, as god. “The 
infinitely Other would not be what it is, other, if it was a positive infinity, and if it did not 
maintain within itself the negativity of the indefinite, of the apeiron.” (Derrida, 1978, 142). 
Positive infinity (god) cannot be infinitely other; if positive infinity requires alterity (as it 
does in Levinas) then all language must be renounced, including the words ‘infinite’ and 
‘Other’. “Infinity cannot be understood as Other except in the form of the in-finite.” (Derrida, 
1978, 142). It is only the concrete which can be different. If infinity is thought of as positive, 
then “the other becomes unthinkable, impossible, unutterable.” (Derrida, 1978, 142). Derrida 
states: “The other cannot be what it is, infinitely other, except in finitude and mortality (mine 
and its)” (Derrida, 1978, 143). It is impossible to think of the Other’s face as infinity when it 
is precisely the concrete and finite which characterize it and allow for its alterity, and 
consequently the Other must be thought of as appearing in space.  From the focus on the 
Other’s physicality Derrida arrives at a fundamental symmetry: “If the face is body it is 
mortal. Infinite alterity as death cannot be reconciled with infinite alterity as positivity and 
presence (God)” (Derrida, 1978, 144). It is impossible to speak about the face and infinity at 
the same time. If the Other has a face then it is mortal; if we are to speak of metaphysical 
transcendence, it cannot be at the same time transcendence towards the Other as death, and 
towards the Other as god. The self is mortal, but so is the Other; the Other is human, an alter-
ego, and Derrida criticizes Levinas for making the Other so that it is no longer human. 
Derrida criticizes Levinas for his complete division between ‘the same’ and ‘the 
Other’, in which the Other gains a dimension of infinity, in which otherness becomes 
absolute, while the same becomes a closed totality. ‘Infinitely other’, states Derrida, is a 
contradiction in terms; the Other cannot be Other if it is completely exterior to the same. To 
be Other can only be ‘other than’ – it is an inherently relational term. For something to be 
other to me it must be ‘other than me’, and if it is so it is in relation to an ego and no longer 
infinite. Derrida illustrates a loop in which the infinitely Other cannot be infinitely Other 
unless it is other than itself, but then it would not be what it is, namely infinitely Other, and 
so on. Following this, if the Other cannot be absolutely, infinitely other, nor can the same be 
completely closed off: “the other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to 
be other; and that, consequently, the same is not a totality closed in upon itself […]” 
(Derrida, 1978, 158). The same and the Other cannot be fully separated; there is no absolute 
totality, there is always difference within it, and difference only makes sense if it permeates 
the same.  
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The Other cannot be thought of except in relation to an ego; there is an underlying 
symmetry between them. There is only ‘other’ that is partially same and vice versa; either 
there is only the same, says Derrida, “or indeed there is the same and the other, and then the 
other cannot be other – of the same – except by being the other’s other: alter ego.” (Derrida, 
1978, 160). The other as alter-ego is the other as other. This is the fundamental symmetry that 
cannot be escaped; it lies under even Levinas’ ethical dissymmetry, states Derrida, even 
though Levinas would find it intolerable. “The other as alter ego signifies the other as other, 
irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego.” 
(Derrida, 1978, 157). It is only because the Other is an ego that it is a face that can speak and 
understand, and without this symmetry the Other cannot be respected. The relationship 
between the self and the Other is a relationship between two finite ipseities. Derrida states 
that even ethical dissymmetry would be impossible without this underlying symmetry. “That 
I am also essentially the other’s other, and that I know I am, is the evidence of a strange 
symmetry whose trace appears nowhere in Levinas’s descriptions. Without this evidence, I 
could not desire (or) respect the other in ethical dissymmetry” (Derrida, 1978, 160).  I must 
know that I am other to the other, says Derrida, since without this, the “I” (the ego in general) 
would not be able to be a victim of violence. Furthermore, in the dissymmetry Levinas 
describes, the perpetrator of violence cannot be other itself, it must be the same (ego).  
(Derrida, 1978, 157). 
 
3.2: Levinas: Otherwise Than Being 
3.2.1: Proximity: the subject is no longer just the same 
Levinas refines his view in Otherwise Than Being in response to Derrida’s critique; one way 
in which this becomes clear is through the notion of proximity. In proximity Levinas no 
longer speaks of the Other as the most high and as absolutely Other and infinitely distant – 
difference permeates the self and the Other becomes also infinitely close.  
In proximity the subject approaches, it is in a state of motion: “I am not in the 
approach called to play the role of the perceiver that reflects or welcomes” (Levinas, 2009, 
82). The self is no longer static and sure, welcoming of difference, but it is itself in motion, it 
also approaches. Proximity is therefore not a state, but a restlessness; there is no site of 
proximity, it is never at rest and therefore never congeals into a structure. Levinas defines 
subjectivity through the notion of proximity: “Proximity, as the “closer and closer,” 
becomes the subject” (Levinas, 2009, 82). Whereas before the subject was the same, at rest, 
at home with oneself, it is now restless. The self is no longer inherently knowable and present 
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to itself; “One can no longer say what the ego or I is” (Levinas, 2009, 82). The very 
approach that is proximity constitutes subjectivity – there is no endpoint which reveals the 
self as a presence, it is only the approach. The subjectivity of this approaching subject is prior 
to consciousness; it is torn up by difference, “caught up in fraternity” before it is conscious 
of itself.  
As can be seen here, Levinas redefines the notion of the self and the Other so that 
difference infiltrates the self on a fundamental level. It is no longer just the Other who is 
different – difference makes up the self. As such the self and the Other are brought closer 
together; they are no longer in a straightforward opposition in which the self is on the side of 
the same and the Other of radical difference. Instead, they approach each other, caught up in 
the relationship between them. Levinas responds to Derrida’s critique in multiple ways (such 
as for instance with his concept of substitution); here I focus on how his ideas change through 
the notion of proximity. From the initial setup it appears that Levinas manages to account for 
certain things, such as difference in the same. However, despite the changes he makes, the 
further he details his concept of proximity, the clearer it becomes that he is unwilling to let go 
of certain notions that Derrida shows are problematic. The Other still remains radically 
unknowable, and Levinas continues to not allow the Other to become concrete. The Other 
may no longer be spoken of as the most high, but it still does not become a definite Other. I 
follow Levinas’ elaboration on the notion of proximity in order to elucidate some of the ways 
in which he fails to answer Derrida’s critique and ends up stuck in the same issues despite the 
changes that he makes. 
 
3.2.2: The Other is in a non-reciprocal relationship with the subject 
Levinas continues on the point that humanity should not first be understood as consciousness, 
arguing that the subjectivity of the approaching subject is prior to consciousness. Proximity 
refers to humanity, but this is not “as the identity of an ego endowed with knowledge” 
(Levinas, 2009, 83). He goes further than just stating that proximity is prior to consciousness, 
specifying that proximity does not resolve into a consciousness, or the consciousness that a 
concrete being is nearby. Levinas dismisses the notion that proximity implies that the Other 
would be within one’s reach in the sense that “it would be possible for one to take hold of 
that being, hold on to it or converse with it, in the reciprocity of handshakes, caresses, 
struggle, collaboration, commerce, conversation” (Levinas, 2009, 83). At this point, he 
states, proximity would already have been lost, since proximity does not stand to be 
thematized. The fact that Levinas does not allow for reciprocity can be seen in two ways. One 
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is that proximity is more meaningful because of it, because it does not dissolve into the need 
for being returned, it exists beyond any specific interaction. But the other way problematizes 
concrete interactions, with concrete interactions here being specific acts of interaction 
between people, such as the handshakes or conversations Levinas mentions. I argue that 
specific interactions require reciprocity, that without reciprocity the subject and the Other 
never meet, but instead perpetually miss each Other.  
At this point Levinas runs into the same issues that Derrida raised; Levinas keeps to 
the notion that proximity can never refer to a concrete Other – the Other appears in 
proximity, but apparently this approach cannot be characterized by any specific interaction. 
The Other does not appear in any way that the self can interact with – looking at, conversing, 
or touching a specific person already takes the self out of proximity. This leaves Levinas with 
no other option but to speak of a generalized Other, if any specificity is already a breach of 
proximity there is simply no other choice. In that sense Levinas does not manage to gain any 
new ground against Derrida’s critique, he still traps himself in only being capable of speaking 
about an absolute Other, while for Derrida as soon as the Other appears, it must be concrete. 
The further Levinas progresses with the concept of proximity the more in line he stands with 
his previous ideas – he retains a fundamental dissymmetry between the self and the Other 
despite the fact that the Other is no longer inherently higher than the self, and there is still a 
fundamental lack of reciprocity. The subject is obsessed with the neighbour, and this 
obsession is one-sided. The speaking subject is exposed to the neighbour through the act of 
speaking – it is not reduced to the ‘said’, but expresses itself in the ‘saying’. For the subject to 
expose itself like that, states Levinas, it must first be wounded into opening up, and this 
occurs because the Other affects the subject. This effect, however, is not reciprocal, it only 
goes from the Other to the subject, and not the Other way around. The irreversibility is 
necessary for the foundation of the subject: “not to turn into relations that reverse, 
irreversibility, is the universal subjectness of the subject.” (Levinas, 2009, 84). This 
inequality and non-reciprocity characterizes the relationship to the Other and finds its 
expression in responsibility. “In the responsibility which we have for one another, I have 
always one response more to give, I have to answer for his very responsibility” (Levinas, 
2009, 84). This dissymmetry continues to characterize Levinas’ writing. 
Levinas does establish a possibility of reciprocity through the third party, but I argue 
that this is problematic. The face implies the third party through the trace of the infinite: “The 
presence of the face, the infinity of the Other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party” 
(Levinas, 2009, 213). Since the face carries in itself the implication of all of humanity, an 
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interaction between the subject and the Other is always shadowed by the third, and this brings 
out questions of responsibility, reciprocity and justice. But there is an ambiguity there as to 
how this third exactly relates to the subject and the Other. As Bernasconi points out, there is 
an “apparent uncertainty as to how to relate the third party to the face to face relation” 
(Bernasconi, 1999, 76). Levinas alternates between arguing that the third party appears only 
after the relation to the Other in the face to face, or simultaneously with it. In Totality and 
Infinity Levinas rejects the idea that the third party is an addition to the face to face relation, 
but in Otherwise Than Being he alternately argues for both sides (Bernasconi, 1999, 76). 
Bernasconi’s concern is Levinas in relation to politics, so he states that the problem that 
arises if the third is derivative is that it, in turn, makes politics derivative to ethics in Levinas 
(Bernasconi, 1999, 76). Levinas needs the artificial addition of the third because the third is 
needed in order to account for responsibility and justice. 
But if the notion of the third is simultaneous, if it already always shows in the face of the 
Other, then the system works the way Levinas proposes it, as Bernasconi argues, to allow for 
ethics and politics to correct one another (Bernasconi, 1999, 77). I argue, however, that, 
despite positing the mutual connection between the subject, Other, and third, it fails to 
adequately account for the fact that the third would have to be included in the subject as well, 
that the subject would have to carry a trace of the third for the Other. The reason I argue that 
this is problematic for Levinas is because it assumes symmetry. For Levinas there a non-
symmetrical relationship in which the subject faces the Other, the Other contains a trace of 
the third, and the third binds the subject to the Other. Each of these relationships is dependent 
on the other two (for instance, the third cannot bind the subject if the Other does not contain 
the third) which means that they cannot form one by one, but must appear simultaneously. 
But, for Levinas, these relations can only appear in the aforementioned organization; the 
subject cannot bind the Other, for instance, because Levinas insists that they need to be in an 
asymmetrical relationship. Bernasconi describes the development of an eventual symmetry: 
“the Other issues a command that commands me to command the one who is commanding 
me” (Bernasconi, 1999, 80), but, I argue, this is only a resulting symmetry – it is posterior to 
the encounter with the Other. That puts Levinas in a position in which he needs to explain 
why these relations appear in only one of the possible orientations, but this would require an 
additional organizing element, a ‘fourth party’. However, it is then clear that a similarly 
structured argument could be made, forcing one to posit a ‘fifth party’, and so on ad 
infinitum. Because of this, I consider reciprocity to still be a problem for Levinas, and in the 
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following chapter I detail what Camus’ concept, which does contain symmetry, allows for 
that Levinas does not. 
 
3.2.3: The face escapes representation 
Levinas describes proximity as contact with the Other, but this contact neither annuls the 
Other’s alterity, nor suppresses the subject. But in order to achieve this, Levinas frames the 
contact as extremely neutral, stating that “In contact itself the touching and the touched 
separate, as though the touched moved off, was always already other, did not have anything 
common with me” (Levinas, 2009, 86). Levinas neutralizes the notion of contact to the point 
where it can hardly be considered contact at all. The touch between the subject and the Other 
does not involve either of the two being affected.  
Not only does Levinas neutralize the contact with the Other, but he goes on to say that 
the Other cannot be properly said to appear. Everything that appears must appear through an 
empty horizon, and this a priori horizon already puts the thing that appears in a sort of genus. 
The thing that appears may be unique, but it still belongs to a genus and is still preceded by a 
horizon which is the necessary condition for its appearance. But the Other is completely 
different, it does not have any thing that can precede it and announce its appearance. “He 
does not appear. What sort of signaling could he send before me which would not strip him of 
his exclusive alterity?” (Levinas, 2009, 86). The Other, then, has no essence, genus, or 
resemblance – it is a priori. “Not coming to confirm any signaling made in advance, outside 
of everything, a priori, the neighbor concerns me with his exclusive singularity without 
appearing” (Levinas, 2009, 86). The Other assigns the subject before the subject can 
designate it.  
So the face escapes representation: “it is the very collapse of phenomenality” 
(Levinas, 2009, 88). It is too weak to appear, it leaves only a trace of itself; its features only 
capture a trace of its past, not its present. On this point Levinas does not attempt a 
reconciliation with Derrida – he stands on the point that the Other does not appear as a 
phenomenon, and in doing so leaves himself open to the original criticism Derrida relayed, 
namely, that it is impossible to speak of an Other who does not appear. Derrida argued that 
Others exist in space, and the concreteness of the body of the Other cannot be disregarded. 
Levinas continues to not account for this, as for him the image of the face always betrays the 
Other. Levinas says of the neighbour: “It is precisely in his image that he is no longer near” 
(Levinas, 2009, 89). The image captures a concrete moment, makes it visible and 
comprehensible, and this is violent towards the Other who carries a trace of the infinite. So 
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here again Levinas resists the idea of the concreteness of the Other – the Other does not 
appear, and hence is not allowed to have any concrete features. Any features that the Other 
has are a betrayal, since they do injustice to the infinity of the Other. 
 
3.3: Conclusion 
It has now become clear that, despite the changes that Levinas makes, he retains a depiction 
of an Other who is still not allowed to be concrete, and who still stands in a dissymmetry in 
relation to the subject. The subject has changed, it has become a stranger to itself, but its 
position regarding the Other remains the same – the subject is still guilty. The only difference 
is that this guilt has permeated the subjects existence on a deeper level: “to revert to oneself 
is not to establish oneself at home […] it is to be a stranger, hunted down even in one’s home 
contested in one’s own identity” (Levinas, 2009, 92). So while the subject has changed, it still 
remains below an infinitely high Other. And in relation to this infinitely high Other, the 
subject can only ever be passive. The subject is now exposed to the Other and this exposure is 
passivity that is only expanded by speaking. “The act of speaking is the passivity in 
passivity” (Levinas, 2009, 92). The subject exposes itself to the Other in passivity and this 
passivity is “opposed to the imperialism of consciousness” (Levinas, 2009, 92). There still 
remains a lack of possible action; the subject is stopped in its tracks in the face of the Other 
and moved into passivity. The Other still carries a trace of infinity and does not appear as a 
phenomenon. So there is no clear indication of how the subject and the Other can come into 
contact with each Other, since the Other’s physicality is still neutralized alongside any 
concreteness of features.  
Chapter 4: Symmetry 
The previous chapter discussed the difficulties Levinas runs into with his dissymmetrical 
conception of the Other in regards to interaction. This chapter shows that Camus structures a 
different possibility for interaction through his focus on symmetry between the subject and 
the Other, and examines the consequences of this different framework. I first detail Camus’ 
understanding of identification through the rebellious encounter, then connect the importance 
of the symmetry and mutual limitation that is ingrained there to the possibility of interaction 
and the creation of meaning that is dependent on this interaction. The question of the creation 
of meaning through interaction becomes an important distinction between Camus and 
Levinas. I finally examine what Camus envisions as a positive transformation in society 
35 
 
based on these foundations he lays down, and end by examining the differences between 
Camus and Levinas in regards to activity and passivity in relation to the Other.  
 
4.1: Symmetry and interaction: the rebellious encounter in more detail 
The first chapter briefly discussed what can be termed ‘the rebellious encounter’. As I have 
stated there, Camus does not speak of an encounter in a way that can be paralleled with 
Levinas in a straightforward manner; Levinas speaks of an encounter which covers the first 
moment the subject becomes aware of the Other, while Camus is interested in rebellion, so 
his exploration starts from the rebellious moment. He is interested in examining what 
composes the moment of rebellion, and his examination presumes the rebellious moment has 
occurred. He wants to work out what the moment implies once it has occurred. So while his 
encounter does not directly parallel Levinas’, there are still a number of similarities. Camus 
considers the rebellious encounter to be a moment that awakens consciousness. This 
rebellious moment does not account for the entirety of human interaction, nor is it the first 
moment of the encounter with the Other, but despite this it is a moment in which the subjects 
affirms its own humanity as well as that of the Other.  
It is this affirmation and awakening of consciousness that I detail here, to show how 
through it Camus escapes the pitfalls brought up by Derrida. As a lot of this has already been 
introduced, I here focus specifically on the rebellious encounter as an awakening of 
consciousness and what the consequences of the fundamental symmetry inherent in it are.  
 
4.2: Rebellion as the moment of identification  
Rebellion for Camus is the moment of identification: “An awakening of conscience, no 
matter how confused it may be, develops from any act of rebellion and is represented by the 
sudden realization that something exists with which the rebel can identify himself –even if 
only for a moment” (Camus, 1954, 20). What starts out as a refusal, grows into identification. 
The rebel begins to establish limits that should not be transgressed, and these grow into 
values that are more important to the rebel than life. “Having previously been willing to 
compromise, the slave suddenly adopts an attitude of All or Nothing. Knowledge is born and 
conscience awakened” (Camus, 1954, 20). This knowledge the rebel gains is still really 
obscure, but it is at this point that values are born as a transition from facts to rights. Camus 
takes the appearance of the ‘All or Nothing’ to demonstrate that rebellion, although initially 
appearing to be individualistic, it in fact “undermines the very conception of the individual” 
(Camus, 1954, 21). If the rebel consents to die for the sake of the rights defended by the 
36 
 
rebellion, then it is implicit that the rebel values these things beyond his or her own existence. 
“He acts, therefore, in the name of certain values which are still indeterminate but which he 
feels are common to himself and to all men” (Camus, 1954,  21). Camus sees this affirmation 
as removing the subject from isolation at the same time as awakening consciousness and 
giving a reason to act.  
So the arising of consciousness for Camus is simultaneous to the identification with 
humanity. All of humanity – including the oppressors the rebel opposes – must be included in 
the rebel’s identification, but the rebel is acting in order to inhibit and lessen their freedom. 
This can be done for the rebel’s own sake, or just as easily for the sake of someone else. The 
rebel identifies with the victim, but, as Camus specifies, this is not a question of 
psychological identification: “the individual is not, in himself, an embodiment of the values 
he wishes to defend. It needs at least all humanity to comprise them. When he rebels, a man 
identifies himself with other men and, from this point of view, human solidarity is 
metaphysical” (Camus, 1954,  22-3). Here can be seen something similar to Levinas’ notion 
of the third party – since all of humanity is needed to support the rebel’s values, then it is 
clearly never just a confrontation between two parties. But, I argue, by having symmetrical 
relations between the self, the Other, and the third, no problems arise for Camus here, in that 
any relation can be inverted and rearranged freely.  
 
4.3: Limitation and interaction 
In order for rebellion to defend what it wishes to defend, it must aim to curb both its own 
freedom and the freedom of others. Solidarity is born and exists out of rebellion, but it 
destroys itself if it goes too far. “In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion must respect 
the limits that it discovers in itself – limits where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist” 
(Camus, 1954, 27). While Levinas of course practically aims to bring down oppression, in the 
structure of his thought it is always the Other who is faultless and the subject whose freedom 
must be curbed. For Camus, the basic structure is different – the subject can accuse the Other 
and rebel for itself, as well as for Others. The Other is not inherently justified; it is only the 
rebel in the moment in which he takes all of humanity into consideration within his action 
that is justified. And the rebel too ceases to be justified the moment this line is transgressed. 
The limitation of Others (as well as oneself) plays a fundamental role in the structure of 
Camus’ thought. Rebellion denies unlimited power in order to allow for coexistence: “Each 
tells the other that he is not God” (Camus, 1954, 269). This is the only way that Camus sees 
as allowing salvaging everyone, including the thinkers whose philosophies his time had 
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deemed as nihilistic or as failed attempts at justice (naming Nietzsche, Marx, and Lenin as 
examples) – by forcing them under a limit and having them correct one another. Aside from 
inclusion, the other fundamental element of this limitation is that it offers the possibility of 
interaction and identification: “we offer as an example, the only original rule of life today: to 
learn to live and to die, and in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god” (Camus, 1954, 269). 
For Camus it is only through this mutual affirmation as humans that life can be framed in any 
way that allows for meaning. This brings us to the content of what rebellion aims to achieve.  
What rebellion wishes to defend is “that that part of man which cannot be confined to 
the realm of ideas”, or “the passionate side of his nature that serves no other purpose but to 
help him to live” (Camus, 1954, 25). In other words, rebellion is an attempt to save the 
possibility for creating meaning. The rest of this chapter traces the ways in which the 
limitation of the Other allows for the creation of meaning. 
 
4.4: The creation of meaning through interaction 
Time and time again, Camus emphasizes that rebellion is searching for reasons to live, and 
that it cannot base its justification on anything other than itself. Human insurrection, states 
Camus, is a protest against death, or rather a protest against the implications of death – “the 
rebel does not ask for life, but for reasons for living” (Camus, 1954, 73). He continues, “To 
fight against death amounts to claiming that life has a meaning, to fighting for order and for 
unity” (Camus, 1954, 73). What is repugnant, he says, is not simply suffering in itself, but 
rather the fact that suffering is meaningless. The rebel objects to the human condition and 
demands clarity and meaning. eaning, then, is a central objective of rebellion. But meaning, 
for Camus, which can be defined as finding reasons for living, making sense, or giving form, 
stems from the potential for giving meaning that exists between people. He speaks strictly of 
a human-created meaning “I continue to believe that this world has no ultimate meaning. But 
I know that something in it has a meaning and that is man, because he is the only creature to 
insist on having one” (Camus, 1995, 28). Since meaning is a nonsensical term outside of 
human lives, it is contradictory to sacrifice human lives for its sake. “This world has at least 
the truth of man, and our task is to provide its justification against fate itself. And it has no 
justification but man; hence he must be saved if we want to save the idea we have of life” 
(Camus, 1995, 28). So meaning is not given, but it can be created by people amongst each 
other. Camus does not fill the content of this meaning – it would be impossible to do so – but 
he does delineate the parameters within which it can exist. In simple terms, he states that 
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others cannot be mutilated or killed in the name of ideals, but must be allowed to live freely 
in order to give “a chance to the justice that man alone can conceive” (Camus, 1995, 28). 
That is the first condition; a limit must be placed on both the subject and the Other in 
order for them to not override each other, because the moment they do, they undermine the 
meaning they have been creating by uprooting its foundation, which is to say, meaning only 
gains its sense through Others. Meaning can be derived from individual creation, but even 
this is still dependent on interaction, since it is only in only in a human context that meaning 
has any weight. A creative element is inherent to meaning making – the first ‘no’ of rebellion 
must find a reason for itself; it cannot remain only negation, it must affirm something in order 
not to be empty. It is when the rebel begins to stand for something that meaning takes shape. I 
follow what the term ‘meaning’ signifies in Camus, and how he considers it to take shape.  
 
4.5: Creation, meaning, and society 
Camus sees creation as an act which gives form to life where life lacks it. This desire for 
form is described by Camus as the cause of both the best and worst things that can stem from 
human behaviour: “The same impulse which can lead to the adoration of the heavens or the 
destruction of man, also leads to creative literature which derives its serious content at this 
source.” (Camus, 1954, 228). While well aware of the danger of this impulse, Camus also 
considers it to be not only impossible to dispense with, but actually the only possible guide 
towards a fair society. He states: “Civilization is only possible if, by renouncing the nihilism 
of formal principles and nihilism without principles, the world rediscovers the road to a 
creative synthesis” (Camus, 1954, 238). Camus vision of a successful revolution is a society 
which gives first place to “this living virtue on which is founded the common dignity of man 
and the world he lives in, and which we now have to define in the face of a world which 
insults it” (Camus, 1954, 241-2). The reason he speaks of creation as a ‘living virtue’ can be 
seen from the two aspects of the way he defines it: 1) as the giving of form to reality which 
lacks it, and 2) as the free application of oneself to whatever it is one does. I will briefly go 
over both of these points. 
1. Creation is bound up with the rebellious impulse: “In every rebellion is to be found 
the metaphysical demand for unity, the impossibility of capturing it and the 
construction of a substitute universe” (Camus, 1954, 221). Rebellion does not simply 
negate – it negates in the name of something, and it creates and embodies what it 
stands for. Rebellion protests against a meaningless world by creating sense and 
meaning. “Rebellion, from this point of view, is a fabricator of universes. This also 
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defines art” (Camus, 1954, 221). It takes from what reality offers and gives it a form 
which it originally lacked, thereby turning it into something comprehensible. This is 
not to say that the artist can impose unity on reality – that remains a complete 
impossibility – but simply that the artist can take something out of reality and make 
sense of it.  
2.  It is important to point out that Camus is not speaking here only of ‘high’ art, or even 
that he necessitates anything that would take the form of a work of art. What is of 
importance is not necessarily the work that is produced or the way it can be interacted 
with, but rather the subject’s ability to engage with something and apply itself to it. In 
that sense labor is also explicitly included here, provided that it is free. “Industrial 
society will only open the way to a new civilization by restoring to the worker the 
dignity of a creator; in other words, by making him apply his interest and his 
intelligence as much to the work itself as to what it produces.” (Camus, 1954, 238). 
Thus, the creation of meaning is dependent on interaction for Camus, and it is necessary for 
the construction of a more positively arranged society. It does not fall on society to create this 
meaning for anyone: “The absolute is not attained, not, above all, created, through history” 
(Camus, 1954, 266). What Camus concretely means by a good society, is simply one in 
which allows for the creation of meaning: “society and politics only have the responsibility of 
arranging everyone’s affairs so that each will have the leisure and the freedom to pursue this 
common search.” (266). The effect of this is that history, rather than being an object of 
worships becomes “only an opportunity which must be rendered fruitful by a vigilant 
rebellion.” (Camus, 1954, 266). Rebellion – specifically creative rebellion – is again 
presented as a living virtue. It is in a constant act of creation; it creates itself and justifies 
itself in this creation. It is in this sense that rebellion cannot fight for the future, but must 
embody what it stands for in the present; since it is its own justification, it must show in itself 
that it is worthwhile through its actions. “Its merit lies in making no calculations, distributing 
everything that it possesses to life and to living men. […]Real generosity towards the future 
lies in giving all to the present” (Camus, 1954, 268). Rebellion itself is the giving of form. 
“Rebellion proves, in this way, that it is the very moment of life and that it cannot be denied 
without renouncing life. Its purest outburst, on each occasion, gives birth to existence” 
(Camus, 1954, 268).  
Camus states that “perhaps there is a living transcendence” by which he is referring 
to this act of giving form or making sense. “Art thus leads us back to the origins of rebellion, 
to the extent that it tries to give its form to an elusive value which the future perpetually 
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promises, but of which the artist has a presentiment and wishes to snatch from the grasp of 
history” (Camus, 1953, 224). For him transcendence and creation are linked; if anything can 
be spoken of as being transcendent, it must be what people make of reality, what they capture 
from it and turn into something which has value and meaning. At this point can be seen the 
radically different conclusions that Camus’s concept of transcendence and interaction and 
Levinas’ lead to. 
 
4.6: Symmetry vs asymmetry – activity vs passivity  
Camus speaks of both individual creation and interaction – for him meaning must be created 
between people. As was shown in the previous chapter, Levinas does not manage to leave 
this space open. This can again be brought down to the clash between symmetry and 
dissymmetry in the relation to the Other in their works. The activity of art, creating and 
engaging both, for Camus is the creation of unity. Perhaps a reason that Camus sees this 
option where Levinas does not, is because Camus attributes importance to activity as well as 
passivity – the relation to the Other is equal, and as such one’s own needs gain importance. 
As remarked by Hofmeyr, the relationship with the Other in Levinas is a relationship of 
critique, “because the other does not confirm my world but interrupts it.” (Hofmeyr, 2007, 
Criticism: Art’s Salvation?). For Levinas this interruption is of importance – the subject is put 
in radical passivity in the encounter with the Other. Hofmer summarizes: “the spoken word 
directed towards the other person produces transcendence by shattering his/her world of self-
sufficiency dominated by egocentric pursuits” (Hofmeyr, 2007, Criticism: Art’s Salvation?). 
Something like what Camus suggests would not be permitted in a Levinasian world-view. As 
explained by Hofmeyr, Levinas does not regard at least artistic creation as positive in its own 
right: “For Levinas, the artist - situating herself at the heart of her own spectacle - is firmly 
entrenched in this egoist and therefore inadequate existence” (Hofmeyr, 2007, Criticism: 
Art’s Salvation?). Art is seen as having an aspiration towards life, but one that can never go 
beyond being an aspiration, because an artwork can only ever capture an instant. A work of 
art, then, contains a ‘derisory life’ for Levinas. Hofmeyr states: “For Levinas, the eternally 
frozen instant accomplished in art is "the meanwhile", never finished, still enduring - 
something inhuman and monstrous.” (Hofmeyr, 2007, Putting my Freedom into Action: the 
Impact of Art?). He presents art as disengaged and irresponsible because of its distance from 
human lives. This stands in opposition to initiative and responsibility, and as such “it cannot 
ever constitute the supreme value of civilization.” (Hofmeyr, 2007, Criticism: Art’s 
Salvation?). It is possible to salvage art for Levinas through critique – critique can ideally 
41 
 
“link the fixed world of art to the intelligible world - to reintroduce life and time into art.” 
(Hofmeyr, 2007, Criticism: Art’s Salvation?). Critique has the power to re-engage art in this 
way for Levinas because “it signifies a primordial relation with the other person” (Hofmeyr, 
2007, Criticism: Art’s Salvation?). But this does not change the fundamental structure – art is 
still insufficient on its own, and it is still the case that the Other needs to impose passivity on 
the subject. So for Levinas the Other stops the subject and that’s where transcendence lives. 
But the downfalls of that have already been shown – it is one-sided and impotent, it does not 
allow the self to do the same for the Other; it leaves the Other out by refusing to engage it as 
an equal. Levinas does not leave room for meaning to actually take shape, because individual 
giving of form – such as can be found in art – is seen as inherently incomplete and 
insufficient. Direct engagement with the Other is then the only option, but Levinas blocks this 
off too by allowing only a radical passivity towards the Other in which the subject is not 
allowed to make sense of the Other.  
For Camus any transcendence that may be spoken of exists in the meaning that’s 
shared between the self and the Other; the subject and the Other both engage each other, 
rather than that the Other paralyzes the subject. There is movement and interaction between 
the two, which allow for the creation of meaning. And meaning that is found is not 
automatically negative. Art is not reductive of reality – it adds to reality, it supplements it 
with something it lacks. It imposes form, and this imposition does reach towards the Other, 
but it can stop itself before it becomes totalitarian because it is not absolute – art cannot 
overcome reality and force it to function under its rules. Meaning is made possible through 
interaction, but not in an interaction the way Levinas describes it. Instead, it is interaction that 
allows for self-expression, in which the subject and the Other share meaning and create it 
between them. The subject is allowed to want to frame the Other, this is not inherently 
violent. It is possible to capture something for Camus; things can be given form, even if this 
form is incomplete. The danger lies in assuming this form can be complete, but it is not 
inherently wrong in itself: “There is an evil, undoubtedly, which men accumulate in their 
passionate desire for unity. But yet another evil lies at the roots of this confused movement. 
Confronted with this evil, confronted with death, man from the very depths of his soul cries 
out for justice” (Camus, 1954, 267). The creation of from, should it manage to escape the 
danger of becoming totalitarian, provides something concrete to hold on to. Creativity allows 
for rebellion to be something, to actually offer a positive alternative. 
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4.7: Conclusion 
The question of the possibility of the creation of meaning pushes the framework of the 
interaction between subject and Other in a way that is difficult for Levinas. Although he adds 
the notion of the third, in the structure of just the subject and the Other he does not allow for 
reciprocity. This becomes a problem for him when faced with the question of how meaning 
can arise and exist between the subject and the Other. Camus offers a possibility here through 
engagement. He proposes an identification or arising of consciousness which simultaneously 
affirms the subject and the Other in a relationship of symmetry. From here he stresses the 
importance of boundaries – the subject and the Other both must limit each other in order to 
interact. The Other for Camus is ambiguous; it can be a source of good or bad, just like the 
subject, but through their mutual limitation they can engage each other and through this 
engagement create a certain sense and meaning in the world. This interaction is the necessary 
foundation for the creation of meaning – ‘meaning’ is a term that makes sense only between 
people, and no act of creation can develop something that holds a truth beyond what people 
attribute to it. But from this foundation Camus allows for the giving of form through work 
that is individual expression and engagement rather than a direct interaction with the Other. 
This is a sort of making-sense that the subject can do for itself and choose to engage with, 
allowing the subject to attribute form to its own life, something which Camus attributes great 
importance to. For him creating meaning is a necessity for living life, and he designs a 
framework in which this is possible, finally defining a positive society as one in which this 
pursuit is made possible. Instead of a passivity in the face of the Other, Camus proposes a 
mutual limitation, one which allows for the necessary movement for the creation and 
engagement with meaning.  
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Final Conclusion 
This paper has been concerned with the establishing of a foundation for the interaction with 
the Other and the ways in which Camus and Levinas differ on this point. In the first chapter I 
established some key differences in the relationship between subject and world in these two 
thinkers, and the ways in which these differences inform the relationship between subject and 
Other. I named a difference in the placement of the tension that exists between world, subject, 
and Other, for which the question of the height of the Other became relevant, and 
consequently the use of the term ‘transcendence’. The following chapter examined the use of 
transcendence in these two authors, starting by showing the similarity in the necessity they 
both find in using this term in in defense of the value of human lives and the assertion that it 
should stand above history. This was followed by pointing out the differences in their use of 
the term, despite their similar aims, focusing on how for Camus the use of transcendence 
does not imply an infinitely high Other as it does in Levinas. The third chapter examined 
Levinas on this point in more detail, leaning on Derrida to criticize his concept of the Other, 
and taking into account Levinas’ later works and how he changes the use of these concepts 
there. I assert that although Levinas changes his concept of the Other so that the Other is no 
longer the most high, the fact that he maintains an asymmetrical relationship to the Other 
causes problems for him in terms of interaction. The final chapter focuses on Camus to 
illustrate what I find lacking in Levinas, namely, a symmetrical relationship with the Other in 
which the subject and Other are allowed to limit each other, and through this limitation create 
meaning between them.  
In a sense, this paper has polarized the differences between Camus and Levinas in 
order to pinpoint where they diverge and what some of the implications of these differences 
are. Despite the differences in the specifics of the relationship with the Other, however, much 
of their thinking is in line with each other. They both see ethics as first philosophy, and they 
both understand subjectivity as inseparable from the relationship with the Other. From then 
on, they understand answering the responsibility towards the Other as the only possibility of 
engaging with life and living it in a meaningful way. Since they deal with issues that are so 
closely linked, it is valuable to compare them to each other in order to gleam ways in which 
they can correct and supplement each other. This paper has attempted following one possible 
thread between them, but there are multiple possibilities that can be explored if the 
conversation between the two is kept open.  
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